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Abstract This paper deals with the semantics of de dicto, de re and de se belief
reports. First, I flesh out in some detail the established, classical theories that assume
syntactic distinctions between all three types of reports. I then propose a new,
unified analysis, based on two ideas discarded by the classical theory. These are: (i)
modeling the de re/de dicto distinction as a difference in scope, and (ii) analyzing de
se as merely a special case of relational de re attitudes. The resurrection of these
ideas takes place in a dynamic setting. My formalization of the first idea involves a
modification of the presupposition-as-anaphora resolution algorithm for DRT. The
second involves treating acquaintance relations as second-order presuppositions, to
be bound in the context by means of higher-order unification, or accommodated if
necessary. The resulting framework requires no syntactic distinctions between
different modes of attitude, with the exception of a specific subclass of de se reports
characterized by special ‘de se pronouns’ (i.e. PRO and logophors). These special
pronouns are handled in syntax; everything alse is passed on to the pragmatic
resolution module as it appears on the surface. The more sophisticated contextual
resolution process nonetheless ensures adequate output truth conditions for a variety
of classical and novel puzzles. In particular, I compare the new pragmasemantic
system to the classical, syntactic analysis with respect to iterated and quantified
reports, and monstrously shifted indexicals.
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1 Introduction: modes of beliefs and reports
When presented with a bottle of Coke and a Pepsi, John tries both and concludes
that Coke is better. We can report this belief of John’s in English with a believes
that construction:
(1) John believes that Coca-Cola tastes best
In this paper I present a novel semantics of belief reports like (1). More specifically,
I argue for a pragmatic analysis of the three different modes of belief reporting that
have been discussed in the literature. These three modes are known as de dicto, or
propositional, belief; de re belief, about external objects one is acquainted with; and
de se belief, about oneself from a first person perspective. Henceforth I use the term
‘de dicto report’ to mean nothing more than a report of a de dicto belief, and
similarly for de re and de se.
It is commonly assumed that the de dicto/de re distinction in beliefs corresponds
to a syntactic distinction in belief reports. More recently, based on data involving
quantified reports, unambiguous de se, and shifted indexicality, the view that the de
re/de se distinction also corresponds to a syntactic distinction has emerged.
A crucial observation is that it is not always visible from the report’s surface
what kind of belief it is supposed to report: English believes that can be used to
report de dicto, de re and de se beliefs. For de dicto and de re this phenomenon is
well-known as the de dicto/de re ambiguity. If the belief complement of a report
contains a definite description, for instance, it is called ambiguous between a
general, de dicto reading, and a de re one about the actual denotation of the
description (cf. Sect. 2). Belief reports with embedded pronouns agreeing with the
matrix subject, John believes that he is good looking, are often called ambiguous
between a de re and a de se reading (cf. Sect. 3).
I propose a new semantics of belief reports that does away with these syntactic
ambiguities. My principal inspiration is the analysis of de re attitudes in terms of
acquaintance relations (Kaplan 1969; Lewis 1979; Cresswell and von Stechow 1982).
I analyze the distinction between de dicto and de re reports as the difference between
global and local presupposition resolution, where I modify van der Sandt’s (1992)
resolution algorithm in such a way that projection out of a belief embedding is
accompanied by the introduction of an acquaintance relation. To address a number of
serious defects of the inherently unified relational analysis of de re and de se,
I incorporate the context-dependence of acquaintance in my dynamic framework. The
resulting theory utilizes the dynamic character of DRT and the flexibility of the
presupposition resolution algorithm to handle not only the classic puzzles involving
double vision and de re/de se ambiguities, but also the more recent data involving
iterated reports (Sect. 5), quantified reports (Sect. 6), and shifted indexicals (Sect. 7).
The proposed framework sheds new light on some of the data, such as the context-
dependent difficulty of non-de se interpretation of ambiguous reports. However, the
primary gain is theoretical: instead of tinkering with the syntax and morphology, my
aim is a simple, uniform syntax and semantics where de dicto, de re and de se reports
430 E. Maier
123
receive the same compositionally generated preliminary logical representations. On
the basis of these representations and the context, an extended, pragmatic mechanism
of presupposition resolution is to derive the correct truth conditions.
A specific benefit of such an approach would be that all pronominal features are
interpreted directly according to their surface form, rather than requiring occasional
deletion under morphological agreement. As it turns out, almost all the English
report data can be captured uniformly in this way. In the end, though, one subclass
of de se reporting resists a full reduction to pragmatics. This eventually leads me to
acknowledge a special class of syntactically de se reports, characterized by the
occurrence of ‘de se pronouns’ such as PRO and logophors.
2 De dicto and de re
The philosophical literature on the logic of attitudes distinguishes a number of
fundamentally different ways of believing things. The best known distinction is that
between de dicto and de re beliefs, i.e. general beliefs about what the world is like
as opposed to beliefs about actual objects external to a belief.
2.1 The semantics of de dicto beliefs and reports
De dicto beliefs are those that describe how the subject believes the world to be. If
John utters a general statement like All diet stuff tastes awful, he thereby expresses
the proposition that all diet food and drinks taste awful. Presumably, he would do so
because he believes it’s true, i.e. he believes that the world is such that diet food is
awful. Such a propositional belief is called de dicto. In possible worlds semantics,
propositions are sets of possible worlds (p  W) and we associate with every
subject x at a a possible world w a belief set Belðx;wÞ, the set of worlds compatible
with x’s belief state at w. Believing a proposition then means that the proposition
holds of every belief alternative, i.e. Belðx;wÞ  p.
Now we apply this to the semantics of belief reporting sentences. The LF of a de
dicto believes that construction and its interpretation are straightforward. The that-
clause expresses a proposition that the matrix subject is said to believe. Syntactically:





all diet stuff tastes awful
We can state a compositional semantics by providing translation rules mapping
terminal nodes to expressions in a higher-order lambda calculus with basic types e
Presupposing acquaintance 431
123
(entities) and t (propositions).1 The translation of a branching node in the tree is
then given by functional application of the translations of the daughter nodes (in the
direction allowed by the types).
As a first approximation the translation of the proposed lexical entry ‘believ-
esde dicto’ is in terms of a modal operator Belx.
(3) believesde dicto ! kpkxðBelxpÞ type: tet [to be revised]
Applied to our example report (2), we get the following logical translation of the
entire tree:
(4) Belj8x½dietðxÞ ! awfulðxÞ
The modal operator Belj is interpreted model-theoretically in terms of a function
Bel that maps an individual at a world to his belief set at that world, provided by the
model (I’m disregardng times and tenses throughout this paper):
(5) ½½Belnu ¼ fw 2 W

Belð½½n;wÞ  ½½ug
Applied again to our example: ½½ð4Þ ¼ fw 2 W Belð½½j;wÞ  ½½8x½dietðxÞ !
awfulðxÞg ¼ fw 2 WBelðJohn;wÞ  fv 2 W diet foods in v  awful tasting
things in vgg, i.e. (2) expresses the proposition that all of John’s belief alternatives
are such that all diet foods and drinks in them taste awful.
2.2 De dicto and de re reporting as a matter of scope
To bring out the contrast between de dicto and de re beliefs, beliefs about external
objects, consider the following report:
(6) John believes the president of PepsiCo is rich
This could mean two very different things. First, it might mean that John believes
the proposition that whoever is the president of PepsiCo is rich, on the basis of, say,
his general belief that presidents of large corporations are always rich. This is the de
dicto reading that we’ve discussed above. Crucially, the de dicto belief does not
require that John, or the reporter, or us, have any idea who the president of PepsiCo
is. The concept of being the president of PepsiCo is an integral part of the reported
belief. Therefore, in the report, we cannot substitute the president of PepsiCo with
Indra Nooyi, even if Indra Nooyi is in fact the current president of PepsiCo. We can
often force this de dicto reading of a report by adding a wh-ever that may be
qualification to the embedded definite description.
1 Analyzing type t as an intensional type, for proposition denoting expressions, is intensional overkill,
but it is quite useful for keeping representations simple. It does add some complexity at the level of
model-theoretic interpretation, where the basic semantic value of a formula is no longer the truth value
but the proposition expressed at a possible world.
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But there is an additional reading of the sentence. John believes of a certain
individual who is the actual president of PepsiCo, that she is rich. On this de re
construal, the report is felicitous if John just talked to Indra Nooyi at a party about
her yacht, and believes ‘‘wow, this woman is rich’’. It is irrelevant whether John
knows that the woman he is talking to is the president of PepsiCo, or that her name
is Indra Nooyi, as long as the term used by the reporter picks out the individual his
belief is about. In other words, a de re belief is a belief about an individual, the res,
independent of the particular description used by the believer or reporter. Therefore,
in a de re (reading of a) report, we can always replace the name or description of the
res with a co-referential one, salva veritate. A de re reading can be forced with the
believes of . . . that . . . construction.
As a first approximation we might try to cash out the difference between de dicto
and de re readings of reports as differences in scope. If the embedded definite is
interpreted in situ, in the scope of the intensional belief operator, that co-reference
does not warrant substitutio salva veritate, given our standard possible worlds
semantics. If the embedded definite takes scope over the belief operator, it will
license the substitutions characteristic of de re. For concreteness’ sake, let’s analyze
the somewhat simplistically as an operator of type ðetÞe, i.e. as denoting a function
picking out the unique element of the set it takes as argument.2 Additionally, let’s
model the wide scope interpretation of the description by means of quantifier
raising. The de dicto and de re readings of (6) would then get LFs and logical
translations like 7(a) and 7(b):
(7) John believes the president of PepsiCo is rich
a. de dicto LF b. de re LF
Beljðrichðtheðpres pepsiÞÞÞ theðpres pepsiÞkyðBeljðrichðyÞÞÞ
In Sect. 2.3 we’ll see why this scopal account fails and how the relational atti-
tudes solution works. My own proposal will combine relational attitudes with ele-
ments of the scopal account just sketched.
2.3 Double vision and relational attitudes
I’ll reconstruct Quine’s (1956) ‘double vision’ argument against de re beliefs as
involving actual objects, and hence against the wide scope accout of de re reporting
presented above, by adding a Pepsi Challenge to the scenario from the beginning of
2 Ignoring independent presupposition issues, we’ll simply assume that in every relevant world PepsiCo
has a unique president.
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the paper. I will then introduce the relational account of de re and show how it
solves the double vision puzzle.
In the Pepsi Challenge there are two cups, marked ‘M’ and ‘Q’. John takes a sip
of each and concludes that the drink labeled ‘M’ is the best, i.e. he forms the de
dicto belief that M tastes best. Because of the direct perceptual contact with the
drink, we may assume that he also has a de re belief about it, i.e. (8) is true:
(8) John believes de re of M that it tastes best
As the host knows, but not John, M is actually Pepsi. So the host may felicitously
report John’s choice to his audience as in (9):
(9) John believes de re of Pepsi that it tastes best
Now recall the example at the beginning of the paper, (1), where we ascribed a
seemingly contradictory belief to John. Given that that belief was also based on (this
time non-blind!) experience with both brands, we conclude that it too is de re, i.e.:
(10) John believes de re of Pepsi that it’s inferior to Coke
So does John believe contradictory things about one and the same substance? In a
sense, the answer must be yes. The problem is that believing a logical contradiction
is certainly too strong (for then it would follow that he believes every absurdity).
The standard solution, which forms the basis for my own account, involves
modes of presentation. De re beliefs are not about bare objects as such, but about
objects presented to the believer in a certain way. From the early encounters it
follows that John believes of Pepsi as presented in a Pepsi-branded can that it has
inferior taste, while from the Challenge we learn that John believes de re of Pepsi as
presented in a cup labeled ‘M’ as part of a blind experiment that it tastes best.3 Both
beliefs are equally de re about Pepsi, and hence both (9) and (10) are true, yet they
are not directly contradictory because the unpronounced different modes of pre-
sentations under which the beliefs are held make them distinct.
Now, if these modes of presentations are not visible at the surface in the reports
(9) and (10), where did they come from? To answer this question it is important to
see first that not all intensional descriptions count as suitable modes of presentations
of de re belief. Merely saying you ‘like whatever tastes best’ does not mean you
have a de re belief about Pepsi under the mode of presentation ‘the best tasting
soda’; if it did, even people who have never drunk Pepsi or any other cola would
automatically believe de re of Pepsi that it tastes best, rendering the whole notion of
de re as ‘about an actual object’ vacuous. The upshot of this argument4 is that
modes of presentations must be restricted.
3 As it turns out, it’s precisely this label ‘M’ that makes the Pepsi Challenge work. No matter which cup
contains the Coke, the ‘M’ is chosen significantly more often than the ‘Q’ (cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Pepsi_Challenge).
4 This argument is sometimes referred to the ‘shortest spy problem’ after Quine’s original example
involving the trivial belief that the shortest spy is a spy.
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In the true de re examples above, we already saw that the descriptions were
intimately related to the particular circumstances that led us into calling the beliefs
in question de re about something external in the first place. Following Kaplan
(1969) and Lewis (1979) we say that de re belief requires the subject to be vividly
acquainted with a res, and that it is this acquaintance relation that supplies the mode
of presentation of the res. We thus reduce de re to de dicto, or, in order not to
confuse terminology, to propositional belief as in (5), by simply substituting the
mode of presentation (in the form of an individual concept/definite description) for
the res inside the belief.
This brings us to the following, relational semantics of de re belief:
(11) x believes de re of y that y is P iff there is a relation R with:
a. R is a vivid relation of acquaintance between x and y in the actual
world
b. x believes (de dicto) the proposition that the object he is R-acquainted
with is P.
Before turning this into a real semantics of the standard English de re report con-
struction, we can already see that under this definition, our John indeed has the two
semi-contradictory de re beliefs discussed above by taking: x ¼ John; y ¼ Pepsi;
PðxÞ ¼ x tastes best; R1ðx; yÞ ¼ x drinks cola y from the cup marked M (for the
Challenge scenario); and R2ðx; yÞ ¼ x drinks cola y from a Pepsi-branded can (for
the non-blind scenario). This shows a way out of both the double vision dilemma,
and the subsequent problem of restricting descriptive modes of presentation. The
essence of the solution is that different acquaintance relations engender different
modes of presentation and thus different propositional beliefs.
Now let’s implement (11) in the syntax and semantics of the de re readings of
believes that. For this to work, we need the semantic separation between res (y) and
ascribed predicate (P) that is brought out by the believes of paraphrase. Crucially,
this separation is not apparent in the more natural propositional attitude construc-
tion, where the straightforward parse yields only de dicto. As we saw in Sect. 2.2
however, a belief complement with a definite often allows a real de re interpretation,
alongside de dicto. If we want to maintain compositionality of translation and
model-theoretic interpretation, we can only achieve the separation required by the
de re reading by means of a syntactic movement operation (Cresswell and von
Stechow 1982). I cash out this ‘res movement’ by moving the DP denoting the res
to an extra argument position on the attitude verb:
(12) [....] believes the president of PepsiCo is rich
a. de dicto LF b. de re LF
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The subscript on believes reflects the fact that attitude verbs are now lexically
ambiguous between denoting a propositional attitude operator, (3), and a more
complex relational operator, whose interpretation is based on (11). More specifi-
cally, the translation of believede re takes as arguments (a representation of) the
moved res term, an ascribed property, and a subject:
(13) believede re ! kykPkx9R½Rðx; yÞ ^ BelxðPðtheðkvðRðx; vÞÞÞÞÞ
[to be revised]
Thus, we arrive at the following logical translation of the de re LF:
(14) 9R½Rðj; theðpres pepsiÞÞ ^ BeljðrichðtheðkvðRðx; vÞÞÞÞÞ
In words, the de re reading of (12) is true iff there is an acquaintance relation
between John and the president of PepsiCo and John believes that the person he is so
acquainted with is rich. In Sect. 3.1 below, I’ll modify this definition somewhat by
replacing the underlying propositional belief operator to one of property self-
ascription.
3 De re and de se beliefs and reports
3.1 From propositions to properties
Besides de dicto and de re beliefs, philosophers and linguists have argued for a third
mode: de se (Castan˜eda 1966; Perry 1977; Lewis 1979; Kaplan 1989). Consider the
following example.5 In an experiment some male speakers of different sexual ori-
entations are recorded after reporting their sexual orientation. They are then asked to
rate all recorded passages, including their own, on a scale from gay to straight.
Frank is gay, he knows it and deliberately tries to ‘sound gay’. When approached for
the experiment he said: ‘‘I sound gay.’’ Frank thereby expresses a de re belief about
himself (one is after all very vividly acquainted with oneself) that he sounds gay.
Chris, who would never describe his own voice as gay, also participates in the
experiment. Now he’s listening to the recordings and when he gets to #12 he marks
it as ‘very gay’, not realizing that this is his own voice. Thus, Chris also expresses a
de re belief about himself, because listening carefully to recording #12 brings him
into a perceptual acquaintance relation with himself. The difference between the
beliefs is that Frank’s is not only de re about himself, but (pure) de se: he believes
he himself sounds gay from his own first person point of view, while Chris’ belief is
about himself from a third person perspective. More specifically, beliefs that the
believer would express with a first person indexical (I) correspond to first person





The example brings out the importance of the indexical point of view in the
analysis of belief. At a propositional level Chris’ thought ‘‘#12 sounds gay’’ is
indistinguishable from ‘‘I sound gay’’, though he might utter the former, but not the
latter. This prompted Lewis (1979) to switch from propositions as objects of belief,
to properties that the believer self-ascribes: Frank’s first person utterance means he
self-ascribes the property of sounding gay, while Chris self-ascribes the distinct
property of listening to a recording #12 that sounds gay. Propositional belief, as
used in the semantics of de dicto and de re above, is just a special case of property
self-ascription. Believing proposition p amounts to self-ascription of the property of
inhabiting a world where p holds. For uniformity we now revise the semantics of de
dicto and de re reports from the previous section accordingly.
First, we assume that the model associates with a believer not a set of worlds, but
a set of centered worlds. Still ignoring times, the belief set of John, Belðj;wÞ, is the
set of pairs hw0; ai, where w0 is a world compatible with what John believes and a is
an individual John believes to be. In Haas-Spohn’s (1994) terminology: hw0; ai is a
belief alternative of John (hw0; ai 2 Belðj;wÞ) iff after placing John’s mind in a and
letting him thus explore w0 through the eyes of a, he would not be able to distinguish
that situation from the real world as seen through his own eyes. Then we replace the
propositional belief operator Bel with a self-ascription operator. Officially, the
interpretation of a predicate P maps individuals to propositions, but by assuming
the notational convention that hw; ai 2 ½½P iff w 2 ½½PðaÞ, we will often think of it
as a set of centered worlds, just like our new belief sets. The semantics of the new
Bel operator thus remains almost unchanged:
(15) ½½BelnP ¼ fw 2 W

Belð½½n;wÞ  ½½Pg
In the new translation of de dicto belief, to replace (3), we turn the propositional
complement into the property of inhabiting a world where the proposition holds by
simply adding a vacuous abstraction:
(16) believesde dicto ! kpkxðBelxku:pÞ
And finally, de re. Here the extra abstraction introduced by the property framework
is not vacuous. The second conjunct in the translation proposed in (13) said that the
subject believes the proposition that the subject is acquainted with a unique indi-
vidual, and that that individual has a certain property. We replace that with the
subject self-ascribing the property of being someone who is acquainted with a
unique individual, who has that property:
(17) believede re ! kykPkx9R½Rðx; yÞ ^ BelxkuðPðtheðkvðRðu; vÞÞÞÞÞ
The motivation for building genuine property dependence into the relational
semantics by means of (17) is that it enables a unification of de re and de se, as we
will see in the next subsection.
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3.2 De se as de re
Under the current definition, de se belief comes out as a special case of de re, viz.
the case where R is the relation of equality (substituting ¼ for R above collapses the
complex property to the property of being P) (Lewis 1979, p. 156). Applied to our
de re/de se example, it is easily verified that under this definition both Frank and
Chris believe de re of themselves that they sound gay, but only Frank does so under
the acquaintance relation of equality, i.e. de se.
This unified analysis of de se as de re corresponds precisely to what we find in
English reports with res pronouns referring to the matrix subject. Concretely, a report
like (18) is predicted to be compatible with both a de se and a genuine de re scenario:
(18) Frank believes he sounds gay
To see this consider the de re LF that our current theory assigns to (1):
So, we predict that (18) is true iff there is a vivid relation of acquaintance between
Frank and himself such that Frank self-ascribes being so acquainted with a unique
person that sounds gay. And this is true in our scenario because Frank believes
himself to sound gay, so we can take the relation of equality. In other words, the
relational de re LF is compatible with a de se scenario.
Given the same de re analysis, we also predict that (19) is true:
(19) Chris believes he sounds gay
Since Chris doesn’t even recognize his own voice, this prediction may seem
problematic at first, but I follow the current (philosophers’) consensus that it is
nonetheless correct. Of course it would be considered misleading to word Chris’
predicament in this way if the circumstances of his mistaken identity weren’t al-
ready mentioned or otherwise firmly established in the context (e.g. by adding ‘‘. . .,
but he doesn’t realize it’’, or visually, as when the reporter and her audience are
watching the whole mistaken identity scene unfold).
One of the main selling points of the relational semantics is that for sentences like
(18) and (19) it can do without postulating any kind of ambiguity as a linguistic
correlate to the de re/de se distinction.6 The flip side is that such unified theories
cannot explain the obvious difference in acceptability between (18) and (19) in the
6 The same is true for a Kaplanian quantified character analysis, but von Stechow and Zimmermann
(2005) uncover a fatal flaw in that account (cf. also Maier 2006 for discussion), so I’ll disregard it here.
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given context, even if they are both strictly speaking true. In Sect. 3.3 we first discuss
a related but more serious argument against the relational unification of de re and de
se, involving natural language report constructions that are unambiguously de se.
3.3 Unambiguously de se reports
Besides using a co-referential third person pronoun to refer back to the subject of the
belief, many languages have other ways to report someone’s beliefs about himself.
In English, one may for instance drop the embedded subject pronoun and use an
infinitive or a gerund. As Chierchia (1989) observes, this construction cannot be
used in a mistaken, de re case:7
(20) a. Frank believes to have a gay voice
b. #Chris believes to have a gay voice [*though he doesn’t realize it]
Chierchia uses this contrast to motivate a new, dedicated de se LF. If (20a) can only
be read de se, de se beliefs must correlate with a special LF and interpretation.
Chierchia proposes an analysis of the infinitival construction in which the embedded
subject is a silent PRO that is obligatorily bound by a property abstractor introduced
into the syntax by the de se attitude verb:
ð21Þ Frank believes PRO to have a gay voice
According to Chierchia, the overt pronoun construction discussed in the previous
subsection is actually ambiguous between a de re and de se LF. While PRO is a ‘de
se pronoun’, an element that has to be bound by the attitude verb’s ki, regular
pronouns are ambiguous between a general res-moved interpretation, and a de se
one where they are bound like PRO above by the intervening property abstractor
that comes with thinks/believesde se.
7 Some native speakers report that in English believe+infinitive reports are bad. Others think it’s fine, and
Google supports the latter view with more than 100kGhits on http://www.google.com/search?q=‘‘be-
lieves+to+have+a’’+-which+-who+-whom. I’ve excluded wh-pronouns from this search, but some of
these hits still involve moved objects. Most appear to be genuine examples of the type required, though.
Skeptics should just view my (20) as a pseudo-English gloss of Dutch or Italian where the same de re/de
se contrast holds and where believe/think+infinitive is generally considered felicitous. Alternatively, in
English the point can also be made with other control constructions like expects to+infinitive verses
expects that, which has a similar semantics to belief, or with hopes to/that.
Presupposing acquaintance 439
123
In this paper I want to argue against a syntactic de re/de se ambiguity, and in
favor of the relational view of de se as merely a special case of de re, at least for the
English co-referential he reports. I propose a new, dynamic version of the relational
analysis where acquaintance relations are not existentially quantified over, but
represented as presuppositions that search the context for a suitable antecedent.
Given this goal, it will be important to address the arguments for dedicated de se
LFs. Besides the PRO based argument of this section there is a number of arguments
for de se LFs, based on quantifiers, logophoricity and shifted indexicality.8 In
Sect. 6 I consider the behavior of reports under quantifiers in some detail and show
how my dynamic relational approach holds up against the standard relational
approach and Chierchia’s syntactic de se separatism. In Sect. 7 we return to PRO
and the related phenomena of logophoricity and shifted indexicality.
4 A dynamic semantics for belief reports
In this section I lay out my novel account of de dicto, de re, and de se belief reports.
Its two main ingredients are, (i) an analysis of the de dicto/de re ambiguity in terms
of an enhanced presupposition resolution mechanism, and (ii) a unification of de re
and de se based on the idea of acquaintance relations being provided by the context
rather than being existentially quantified over.9 Both of these ideas crucially rely on
the dynamic, representational framework of Discourse Representation Theory
(DRT), a framework designed to accommodate context-dependence in a principled
fashion, and especially suited for the current task because of the powerful notion of
presuppositions-as-anaphora resolution associated with it.
8 In this paper I ignore a number of arguments for de se LFs and their counterarguments. The first
involves ellipsis. Chierchia (1989) reduces the strict/sloppy ambiguity in John thinks he’s a hero and so
does Mary to the syntactic de re/de se ambiguity. This argument is refuted by Reinhart (1990), who shows
that a non-de se interpretation of the first conjunct is also compatible with a sloppy reading of the second.
The second argument for de se involves ambiguous reports under only. According to Percus and Sau-
erland (2003a) Only John thinks he’s a hero can be true if John is the only one with a de se belief while
others have de re beliefs about themselves being heroes. Anand (2006) argues against their claim that this
implies a syntactic de re/de se ambiguity. However, a proper alternative analysis of the data involved,
within my dynamic framework, is beyond the scope of this paper. Maier (2006) discusses both arguments
and some (more) counterarguments, and outlines a dynamic analysis.
I further ignore here Percus and Sauerland’s (2003b) arguments for a syntactic analysis of de se based
on dream reports like Lakoff’s (1972) I dreamed I was Brigitte Bardot and IB:B:=G:L: kissed meG:L:=B:B:.
In this paper I focus on belief, and Percus and Sauerland’s crucial data are tied to the rather special cases
of dreaming and imagining. In fact, even within that restricted domain, Anand (2006, p. 41) found that
only 15 of his 25 informants shared the relevant intuitions.
Finally, my discussion of cross-linguistic data touching on the de re/de se distinction in Sect. 7 will
remain very limited.
9 This general idea of context-dependent de re acquaintance is not new, cf. e.g. Abusch (1997, fn. 9) and
Aloni (2000, fn. 2, p. 35 & fn. 34, p. 57), who traces the idea back to Hintikka (1967). What is new is my
formalization and its incorporation into a dynamic semantics of belief reports. Entirely new are also the
extensions to quantified reports (Sect. 6), iterated reports (Sect. 5), and shifted indexicality (Sect. 7).
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4.1 DRT and presupposition
I adopt the dynamic framework provided by Kamp’s (1981) Discourse Represen-
tation Theory (DRT) combined with van der Sandt’s (1992) theory of Presupposi-
tion-as-Anaphora (PA). The reason I choose dynamic over static semantics is that
I want to model how the interpretation of a report depends on the information
available in the context: given a co-referential report (Frank believes he sounds
gay), for instance, most contexts should allow a de se reading, but a mistaken
identity context may force a particular de re perspective. I choose DRTþPA over
non-representational dynamic analyses of presupposition because of the principled
account of context-dependence as presupposition binding and accommodation, both
of which mechanisms will play a crucial role in my analysis below.
An example will suffice to illustrate the framework and the terminology. In
dynamic semantics, a discourse is interpreted against the background of a context.
Let’s assume that the part of our scenario where Chris is participating in an
experiment where some recorded voices are being played back to him is common
knowledge between the speaker and her audience. In DRT we represent such
contextual information as follows:
ð22Þ Chris is hearing a voice
Technically, such a DRS box depicts a pair hUðuÞ;ConðuÞi of a set of discourse
referents (the Universe of the DRS u) and a set of Conditions, which can be either
atomic (e.g. chrisðxÞ) or complex (e.g. :w). In (22), UðuÞ ¼ fx; yg and ConðuÞ ¼
fchrisðxÞ; hearðx; yÞ; voiceðyÞg. I use the vertical ellipsis dots in representations
of contexts to signify that the given representation is only an incomplete approxi-
mation of the information actually available in the context.
In dynamic terminology, the DRS in (22) forms the input context for the inter-
pretation of the next sentence in the discourse. The first step in the interpretation of
a sentence is to construct a preliminary representation (henceforth PrelDRS) based
on the syntactic structure of the sentence. This so-called construction phase can be
formalized in the same vein as we’ve been doing in the static framework of the
previous sections. We assume a simple grammar to generate phrase structures. Then
we translate the leafs into lambda terms, which are then combined by function
application. Only now the formal language is the language of DRT+PA. Charac-
teristic of this language is that the contribution of pronouns and other definites is
marked as presuppositional in a PrelDRS. For instance, the translation of a definite
like the president of PepsiCo involves the creation of a presupposition that there is a
uniquely salient individual satisfying the predicate president of PepsiCo. Apart from
definite descriptions, many other types of expressions and constructions, such as
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pronouns, factive complements, and it-clefts, are analyzed as presupposition
triggers. Below, I represent presuppositions as dashed DRS box conditions, as
illustrated in (23), which shows how to translate a pronoun in DRT+PA.
ð23Þ
We use the same non-logical inventory as in the static higher-order system
employed in the previous sections, except that proper names are now associated
with 1-place predicates rather than individual constants, because we analyze names
as presupposition triggers on a par with other definite noun phrases.
Officially, the PrelDRS language needs three distinct types to replace the static
type t, one for DRS conditions (tc), one for DRSs (td), and one for presuppositions
(tp). I will return to the model-theoretic interpretation of DRSs in Sect. 4.2. For
now, note only that in DRT+PA, presuppositions in PrelDRSs are not interpreted
semantically, i.e. tp terms only play a role in the construction and resolution process
and will be absent from the final output representation. Function application in the
construction phase is therefore a purely syntactic affair, i.e. beta-reduction of
lambda terms. After all possible beta-reductions have been carried out, we arrive at
a PrelDRS, which concludes the construction phase:
ð24Þ He doesn‘t recognize it
The next step of the DRT+PA interpretation procedure, resolution, starts with




Then we resolve the presuppositions. We try to bind presupposed discourse refer-
ents to already established ones by matching the associated contents. In our
example, the content of the presupposition of he matches the content associated with
Chris, and it matches with voice. Both of these antecedents correspond to discourse
referents available in the global DRS, which is accessible for presuppositions from
any trigger location. This allows us to bind the presuppositions by unifying the
discourse referents and getting rid of the dashed boxes:
ð26Þ
This mechanism applies not just to pronouns but to all presupposition triggers,
including for instance proper names, definite descriptions and factive complements.
If binding should fail we fall back on accommodation, i.e. the creation of a
suitable antecedent by simply dropping the presupposed referent and content at a
suitable position in the DRS. Although some triggers resist accommodation more
than others, the possibility of accommodation under contextual pressure is often
viewed as one of the defining characteristics of presupposition.
For example, say we add (27) to our conversation:
(27) His best friend Mark burst out laughing
The pronominal trigger his, hidden inside the complex definite his best friend Mark,
is bound to the previously encountered Chris. But what about the alleged best friend
called Mark? Neither the sentence itself, nor the context as a whole provides a
plausible antecedent, so binding is out. Presumably, the speaker wants the audience
to accommodate this new character. We formalize this addition to the common
ground by merging the presupposition with the global context.
In principle, when presuppositions generated in embedded DRS positions have to
be accommodated there may be a number of non-global subDRS positions eligible
for accommodation in the sense that merging there would yield a well-formed,
interpretable output DRS. We’ll encounter such local accommodation in Sects. 5
and 6. The variety of resolution options presented by local and global binding and
accommodation necessitates a preference ranking to avoid explosive overgenera-
tion. For instance, binding is preferred over accommodation, and local binding is
better than global. The ranking of accommodation possibilities is a particularly
controversial issue, but in the standard DRT+PA approach of van der Sandt (1992)
and Geurts (1999), accommodation wants to be as global as possible. These pref-
erences are outranked by global constraints on the well-formedness (avoid free
variables) and coherence (the truth conditions must comply with the Gricean
maxims) of the candidate output DRS.
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An effective way to implement all these constraints is to have the resolution
algorithm systematically try out all binding possibilities starting from the trigger
location and going outward from there. If no viable binding position is found, we turn
around and start checking accommodation options in the opposite direction. If no
pragmatically plausible solution is found when we return to the trigger location the
sentence is judged infelicitous in the given context. For future reference I will spell
out the important steps of the algorithm for resolving a single presupposition below.
(28) Say u is a context DRS merged with a PrelDRS. Look for the most deeply
embedded presupposition in u, call it p. In the course of the algorithm
below we check whether a presupposition can be bound in situ; if not, we
move the presupposition to the DRS immediately subordinating the current
position, and try again. If this keeps failing we have to reverse the direction
and try out accommodation options. As we will thus be moving the
presupposition around when looking for a binding site, we have to mark the
place we started at, in order to perform a proper backtracking for
accommodation: say s is the subDRS in which p is originally triggered.
Binding
i. Determine the projection path of p in u, i.e. a sequence of immediately
subordinating10 subDRSs, from its current, embedded location, up to the
main DRS u: u1@u2@ . . . @un ð¼ uÞ
ii. Determine whether the presupposition can be bound to a discourse
referent in u1, by checking whether the ‘content associated with’ the
possible antecedent ‘matches’ the presupposition’s content. Scare
quotes here indicate two notions that can be defined in many more or
less semantic or syntactic ways, the details of which will not concern us
here. If there is a match, remove the presupposition and replace all
occurrences of the presupposed referent with the antecedent referent
and stop. If not, go to (iii).
iii. If we’re in the main DRS, n ¼ 1, binding has failed and we must try
accommodation, i.e. go to (v). Otherwise, go to (iv).
iv. Move p from u1 to u2 and go back to (i).
Accommodation:
v. Determine the opposite projection path, from u1, the DRS where p is
currently stranded, down to un, the original trigger location s.
vi. Determine whether the presupposition can be accommodated in u1 by
checking whether merging u1 with p in u gives a felicitous
output DRS.11 If so, delete the presupposition and give the merged
DRS as output. If not, go to (vii).
10 v @ w (‘v is immediately subordinated by w’) means that either w contains a complex condition of the
form Belv;:v, or v ) . . .; or there is a condition w ) v.
11 It is often assumed that global pragmatic preferences outrank the accommodation order generated by our
simple back-and-forth algorithm presented here. A more realistic system might generate a number of
possible accommodation outputs, preliminarily ranked from global to local, and then compare those to each
other to select the most felicitous. As I present it here, the algorithm performs only an absolute felicity check.
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vii. If we’re at the trigger location, n ¼ 1, accommodation has failed and
the resolution crashes. Otherwise, go to (viii).
viii. Move p from u1 to u2 and go back to (v)
To sum up, PA induces a two-stage interpretation architecture: from the syntactic
analysis of a sentence a preliminary DRS is constructed fully compositionally, and
then a pragmatic/semantic resolution mechanism connects that preliminary structure
with the context DRS by resolving its presuppositions. The analysis proposed in this
paper will be compositional in the sense that preliminary DRSs are generated
compositionally and resolution is algorithmic. The analysis is furthermore unified in
the sense that these syntactically generated preliminary representations of belief
reports are underspecified for de dicto, de re, and de se. The final output DRSs, by
contrast, are determined in part pragmatically, in interaction with the context: they
are neither fully compositional (in the strong, Montagovian sense), nor unified, since
a de dicto output may be truth-conditionally distinct from any de re output, which in
turn comprises a whole set of specific, mutually distinct beliefs based on different
acquaintance relations, one of which the de se acquaintance of equality.
4.2 Belief in DRT
If we’re interested in belief, we have to add an intensional dimension to the DRT
semantics. In this section we first simply follow the lead of intensional predicate
logic, as laid out in previous sections. Then we evaluate the belief semantics that
this brings us, and we investigate how we might want to extend it.
The first ingredient we need to add to standard DRT is a logic of belief. To this
end, I use the property self-ascription operator, Bel, from Sect. 3.1. For simplicity
I will assume that DRSs denote sets of contexts, i.e. worlds with a designated first
person center, rather than just plain possible worlds.12 In other words, DRSs denote
properties of times and individuals, rather than propositions. This move allows Bel
to apply directly to a DRS without tedious property abstractors:
(29) if u is a DRS and n a discourse referent, then Belnu is a DRS condition.
To give the semantics of Bel in DRT, let’s first go over the basics of DRT
semantics. The central semantic notion is of an assignment verifying or ‘truthfully
embedding’ a DRS or condition in a world (or rather, in a context), which I denote as
f c u. The truth definition states that f is a truthful embedding iff there is an
extension g of f that subsumes Uð/Þ in its domain (henceforth: g UðuÞ f :¼ g  f
and DomðgÞ ¼ Domðf Þ [ UðuÞ) and that verifies all the conditions of u. The veri-
fication of atomic conditions is as in predicate logic. As an example of a complex
condition, consider the implication: f c w ) v iff every g UðwÞ f that verifies the
condition of w, can be further extended to an h UðvÞ g verifying the condition of v.
Finally, ½½uf denotes the set of contexts for which f is a verifying embedding. With
this terminology the semantics of Bel is as follows:
12 Adding context-like parameters to intensional indices is also a rather common strategy, cf. e.g. von
Stechow and Zimmermann (2005).
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(30) f c Belnu iff BelðfðnÞ; cÞ  ½½uf
Maier (2006, 2009) further refines this DRT belief semantics in a two-
dimensional fragment of Layered DRT to account for the semantic context-
dependence and rigidity of indexicals. In that essentially Kaplanian (1989)
semantics, interpretation is relativized to both a context and an intensional world
parameter: f cw u. The center predicate in a belief representation or a main
DRS is then tagged as directly referential (with a layer label), meaning that it
gets evaluated with respect to c rather than w. In this way the meaning of a
referential term like I can do its contextual reference fixing without ending up in
the propositional content. Kaplan assumed that natural language operators see
only intensional content (Prohibition of Monsters), but Schlenker (2003) and
others have argued that report operators are sensitive to both dimensions of
meaning. The standard move at this point would be to collapse the belief
embedded (L)DRS dimensions semantically, through diagonalization. To avoid
distracting technicalities here, I will stick with a one-dimensional, unlayered
semantics, thus obviating the need for diagonalization.
We will instead ensure the interpretability of predicates like center by enriching
the single intensional parameter with a unique speaker/thinker parameter, essentially
making it into a kind of context. It is important to realize that even with this adjustment
we fail to distinguish the reference fixing stage from truth-conditional evaluation (or,
character from content, context from index) which, as Kripke (1972) and Kaplan
(1989) show, makes it hard to distinguish, for instance the person called John and
John, or I and the current speaker. As this issue is independent of the unification of de
dicto, de re and de se I refer the reader to Maier (2009) for a proper analysis of rigidity
in (L)DRT that is compatible with the proposal developed in this paper.
Let’s finish with an example evaluation of a belief DRS:
ð31Þ
13 Since every context, per definition, has precisely one center, we can safely say ‘‘the center’’ here.
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In other words, (31) means that there is a guy named Frank, and any context c0
compatible with Frank’s (x) beliefs is one in which the center (u) sounds gay. This
correctly captures the (true) de se reading of our earlier (18).
4.3 Acquaintance as presupposition
With these preliminaries in place we turn to the interpretation of natural language
reports. We focus first on the de re/de dicto distinction. As I showed in Sect. 2,
sentences of the form x believes that y is P can be used to report x’s de dicto belief
in the proposition expressed by the complement clause, P(y), but also to report her
de re belief about y that it is P. We have also seen that the traditional account of
modalities de re and de dicto in terms of scope leads to an inadequate semantics of
de re beliefs. This led to the introduction of a syntactic ambiguity between de dicto
and de re, where the de re reading corresponds to an LF where the res is moved
out of the complement. This res moved LF, finally, is interpreted as a relational
attitude.
As a first step, let’s just translate this account to DRT, keeping the syntactic
parses intact. We only need to adjust the translation rules for believesde dicto
(cf. (16)) and believesde re (cf. (17)) to give us the right PrelDRS parts:
ð32Þ
Note that instead of quantifying over R, I introduce it here as a presupposition. The
main point of using DRT will then lie in the resolution of the higher-order
acquaintance presupposition, which is the topic of Sect. 4.4.
This is basically the route I followed in my earlier (2006) DRT implementation
of belief reporting.14 The obvious downside is the syntactic ambiguity between de
dicto and de re reports. This is quite alien to the DRT way of thinking in which
syntactic ambiguities tend to be relegated to semantics/pragmatics. In particular,
the DRT+PA architecture seems exceptionally suited for a dynamic reformulation
of the classical scopal analysis, where scope is derived dynamically from the
independently motivated and pervasive mechanism of presupposition projection. A
much more natural formulation of the de re/de dicto ambiguity in DRT would
14 A remark by the anonymous referee about my analysis of Amharic I, got me to reconsider not only the
Amharic example, but the whole distinction between de dicto and de re.
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thus be to generate an underspecified PrelDRS where embedded definites trigger
their usual presuppositions. Restoring the unity of the believe predicate, we get
only the trivial de dicto parse. Henceforth, we’ll use (33) as our sole translation
rule for believe (at least until Sect. 7.3):
ð33Þ
With (33) we generate only one PrelDRS for the de dicto/de re ambiguous
example (6), repeated below, with unified PrelDRS:
(34) John believes the president of PepsiCo is rich
If a presupposition triggered inside the scope of a Bel operator is bound15 or
accommodated inside the belief DRS, we get an output DRS with de dicto truth
conditions:
ð35Þ
If the presupposition projects out of the belief, as they prefer according to our PA
algorithm, we should get de re. Only if the global, de re resolution is pragmatically
infelicitous will we even try the local accommodation option represented above.
Unfortunately, the de re outputs that we generate in this way are simply the wide
scope representations refuted in Sect. 2.
I propose a solution that combines the unified native DRT+PA approach to de
re/de dicto, with the insights from the relational analysis. The essential ingredient
is a more refined mechanism of presupposition projection incorporating the
15 Note that on the standard definition of merging DRSs, there is nothing to bind to inside a belief apart
from material introduced by the embedded clause itself. This is arguably inadequate because it often
happens that an entity introduced de dicto in a belief report is picked up by an anaphoric element in a
subsequent de dicto report. See Bary and Maier (2009) for examples and a solution involving a modi-
fication of the update mechanism compatible with the analysis presented here.
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occasional generation of acquaintance relations when projecting definites out of
belief boxes.
(36) [everything as in (28) except replace clauses (iv) and (viii) with the
extended versions below]
Binding:
iv-a. If the current local context, u1, is not the argument of a belief
condition, i.e. if Belnu1 62 Conðu2Þ, than move p from u1 to u2
and go back to (i)
iv-b. If u1 is the argument of a belief condition we must create an
acquaintance presupposition while we move p up. Say, the belief
operator’s subject parameter is x (i.e. Belxu1 2 Conðu2Þ), and p’s
presupposed referent is y. Choose a fresh relation variable R, and two
fresh discourse referents u and v. Add the presupposition that some
acquaintance relation holds between x and y, @hfRg; fRðx; yÞg,
to u2. Move p from u1 to u2. Replace all occurrences of y
within u1 and its subDRSs with v. Finally, add u and v to the
universe of u1, and centerðuÞ and Rðu; vÞ to the conditions of
u1. Go to (i).
Accommodation:
viii-a. If u2, the next subDRS in the projection path, is not the argument of
a belief condition, move p from u1 to u2 and go back to (v)
viii-b. If u2 is the argument of a belief condition we must clean up the
previously introduced acquaintance presupposition while we move p
up. This is because at this point we are revisiting all the sites where we
first failed to bind p. In particular, encountering a belief condition
means that we must have first crossed that belief and applied (iv-b).
Apparently, all the more global resolution options have turned out to
be dead ends, so we must now undo the effects of (iv-b) before trying
more local accommodation. Technically, say the belief operator’s
subject parameter is x, and p’s presupposed referent is y. Find and
remove any presupposition of the form @hfRg; fRðx; yÞg, with some
second-order, two-place relation variable R, from u1. Then, with that
same R, find the u; v 2 Uðu2Þ with Rðu; vÞ 2 Conðu2Þ. Remove
Rðu; vÞ andv, then replace all remaining occurrences of vwith y. Now
move p from u1 to u2. Go to (v).
To illustrate the extended resolution algorithm let’s return to (34). To resolve the
presupposition we first determine the projection path, consisting of the embedded
and the global DRS. Local binding fails for lack of antecedents. So according to our
algorithm we have to move up, to the global DRS. Since this involves crossing a
belief box we’re directed to (36)[iv-b]. In addition to moving the presupposition up,
we have to create R, u, v, and the acquaintance presupposition. The result corre-
sponds to what we would have otherwise got from the syntactically res-moved LF




Now the context probably contains a suitable antecedent for y somewhere, or else
we can try to accommodate it here. Only if the discourse context somehow does not
seem consistent with the introduction of a president of PepsiCo with whom John is
acquainted, will we have to retrace our steps. In that case, we follow (viii-b) and
clean up the new R presupposition and related materials, and try local accommo-
dation. That gives us the previously represented de dicto output, (35). If global
binding or accommodation does succeed, however, we are left with a new, second-
order presupposition. The next section provides a method for binding those.
4.4 Acquaintance resolution
In this section I present my dynamic version of the relational unification of de re and
de se reports. The leading idea is that acquaintance relations should be provided by
the context rather than by existential quantification. More specifically, the idea is
that this context-dependence can be formalized as a higher-order presupposition,
whose resolution involves higher-order unification.
In the unified de dicto/de re system presented in Sect. 4.3, a global, de re, resolution
of a belief embedded presupposition introduces a second-order acquaintance pre-
supposition, involving a relation variable R that stands for the contextually supplied
acquaintance relation and thus for the description under which the belief is held. In the
resolution stage, this R is to be resolved by first trying to bind it to a suitable relation
already present in the context DRS. This binding is subject to the usual pragmatic and
semantic presupposition binding constraints (salience, accessibility, semantic match)
i.e. it follows the resolution path described by our resolution mechanism (36).
But now note that relations in a context DRS are typically represented by con-
stants in conditions, not by higher-order discourse referents that we can bind to in
the traditional DRT sense. So how can we ever find any plausible antecedent
relation that matches the presupposed content? The solution is Higher-Order
Unification (henceforth HOU, cf. Huet 1975; Dalrymple et al. 1991). This means
that we equate the DRS condition that R holds between believer and res with a
‘suitably parallel’ condition from the context, and then find a unifying substitution
for R to solve this (higher-order) equation. Resolution consists in applying this
substitution to the whole DRS.
Before adding some additional restrictions, let’s illustrate the story so far with an
example resolution of (19). First, we construct the PrelDRS for the ambiguous (19),
repeated below. Remember that, as far as syntax is concerned, we have only the
straightforward ‘de dicto’ parse. Hence the only PrelDRS we derive is (38):
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(38) Chris believes he sounds gay
Next, we add this PrelDRS to a context, in this case a DRS where, among other
things, it is salient (to the reporter and her audience) that Chris is hearing his own
voice, though he doesn’t realize it.
ð39Þ
After the merge we start resolving, following the extended algorithm outlined in
(36). The proper name presupposition is bound in its triggering domain. Then we
turn to the embedded presupposition. This lacks a local antecedent, so it moves up
to the main DRS. Since it thereby crosses a belief box it introduces an acquaintance
presupposition. The original anaphor itself is then bound by Chris:
We have bound the presuppositions triggered by Chris and he to the Chris from the
context, but we have introduced a new second-order presupposition, which we must
now try to bind to something in the context.
According to (39) all we know about R is that Rðx; xÞ must hold. Actually,
because R is supposed to represent an acquaintance relation for a de re belief, we
also know from the discussion in Sect. 2.3 that R must be a vivid relation of
acquaintance, preferably a direct perceptual link between its arguments, though I
will continue to suppress this general information in example representations. Since
x ¼ x always holds, and equality is a highly vivid relation of acquaintance (cf.
Sect. 3.2) we can try binding R to ¼, the relation of identity. Higher-order binding
consists in replacing all occurrences of R by ¼. This gives the output in (40),
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reporting that Chris thought ‘‘I sound gay’’, as shown in the example semantic
computation of a structurally identical DRS in (31):
ð40Þ
If the subject had been Frank instead of Chris, this de se reading would have been
just right, but for Chris it happens to be false in the current scenario. We’ll have to
dig deeper to get the true de re reading that we expect for Chris. We’ll use HOU for
that purpose below.
First we will pause to formulate an essential constraint on acquaintance resolution,
inspired by the remarks about de se above: When resolving an acquaintance presup-
position that is presupposed to hold between a subject and himself we must try to bind to
the (universally available) relation of equality first. This restriction ensures a preference
for de se readings in co-referential reports, thus answering the first objection against the
relational framework, briefly mentioned at the end of 3.2, viz. that the relational analysis
fails to account for any differences in acceptability between the two ‘readings’ of a de re/
de se report. The proposed ‘equality first’ principle explains why people hesitate to
accept (19) as a true report of our mistaken identity scenario. When interpreting such a
report, we first resolve to equality, which leads to an incoherent output DRS, and then we
have to recompute and search the context for a suitable acquaintance relation.
Now to continue the derivation of the marked, non-de se reading of (19). We saw
that the default failed, so we try other resolution options in the order specified by the
algorithm in (36). In this case, that means we search the global context for a salient
and parallel condition to match Rðx; xÞ. We find that hearðx; xÞ is the only suitable
(vivid, perceptual, salient) statement of a relation between x (Chris) and himself. So
we equate these statements:16
(41) Rðx; xÞ¼: hearðx; xÞ
We proceed by using HOU to determine a non-trivial17 substitution that unifies this
higher-order equation:
16 I use ¼: to denote equality in the sense of abg-interconvertability of lambda terms, rather than the usual
semantic co-reference (cf. Dalrymple et al. 1991 and references cited therein).
17 In fact, there are infinitely many solutions, which may be grouped into four different equivalence
classes (under abg-interconvertability of k-terms):
(i) Rðx; xÞ¼: hearðx; xÞ
a. R 7! st½hearðx; xÞ½ 
b. R 7! st½hearðx; tÞ½ 
c. R 7! st½hearðs; xÞ½ 
d. R 7! st½hearðs; tÞ½ 
The first three lead to nonsensical output DRSs, so we could discard them for that reason. Alternatively,




(42) R 7!kskt½hearðs; tÞ½ 
Applying this substitution to our DRS gives:
ð43Þ
In this final output DRS, Chris (x) believes he (u) is hearing someone (v) who sounds gay.
The example above demonstrates how treating acquaintance as a presupposition
derives both de se and de re readings from a unified, compositional PrelDRS and a
slightly modified DRT+PA resolution algorithm. What sets the account apart from
its rivals is that it falls squarely within semantics/pragmatics. I do not rely on any
syntactic ambiguities, movements, or morpho-phonological subtleties (like feature
deletion under agreement a` la Stechow 2002). Instead I use only the independently
motivated mechanisms of DRT+PA and HOU, in combination with the general
relational analysis of de re. This account is the first to cash out the vague idea of
context-dependent acquaintance formally, by switching to a dynamic framework.
Another advantage of treating acquaintance as a presupposition is the built-in
explanation of the observed difficulty of interpreting co-referential pronoun reports
non-de se, viz. by deriving a non-de se derivation only when equality fails and an
alternative is contextually salient, as in our mistaken identity case.
5 Beliefs about beliefs
An interesting testbed for our semantics is the case of iterated belief reports, i.e.
reports of beliefs about beliefs. For instance:
(44) John believes that Mary believes I’m cool
This sentence reports a de re belief (John’s belief about Mary) about another de re
belief (Mary’s belief about me). In Sect. 5.1 I show that the doubly embedded I in
(44) is problematic for the classical relational account, in a context where John
believes there is a de re belief between Mary and me, while in fact Mary’s belief
was about someone else. In Sect. 5.2 I show the extra, syntactic stipulation needed
to account for this problem in the classic relational account. Finally, in Sect. 5.3 I
show how my presuppositional account deals with the example automatically and
compare that with the syntactic account.
5.1 The puzzle of the doubly embedded indexical
Consider the following, new scenario:
(45) John and Mary are friends. Mary says: ‘‘That guy is cool’’. John thought
she was pointing to me. In fact, she’s pointing to Peter.
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From Mary’s utterance it follows that she has a de re belief, not about me, but about
Peter. I would be entitled to report her belief as (46a), but not (46b):
(46) a. Mary believes Peter is cool
b. #Mary believes I’m cool
John also has a de re belief, about Mary. Since he is confused about the object of her
belief he would disagree with our judgments in (46). Because he believes Mary’s
belief is about me, we intuitively judge (47) true:
(47) John believes that Mary believes I’m cool
The puzzling observation is that we use a first person pronoun in (47) even
though neither John’s nor Mary’s belief appears to be de re about me. More
precisely, the straightforward relational parse paraphrasable as John believes of
Mary that she believes of me that I am cool of (47) fails to capture the correct
truth conditions.
To see why, let’s apply the classic relational account of Sects. 2–3. The
most straightforward parse moves both Mary and I to the res positions of their
attitude verb:
ð48Þ
Applying our translation rules we can see why this tree does not represent a sensible
reading. For readability I’ll use aRu as an abbreviation of theðkvðRðu; vÞÞÞ, ‘the
unique individual that u is R-acquainted with’:
(49) 9R½Rðj; mÞ ^ Beljku9R0½R0ðaRu; iÞ ^ BelaRuku0½coolðaRuÞ
The problem with (49) is that there is an indexical, i, occurring inside a semantic
belief operator (Belj). Now, indexicals are rigid designators (Kaplan 1989), which
means that they behave semantically like variables bound from outside the inten-
sional operator. Hence, like with the wide scope descriptions rejected in Sect. 2.3,
we should be able to create a double vision scenario to disqualify this logical form.




(50) John and Mary meet me again. John doesn’t recognize me from the
first encounter. Mary to me: ‘‘You’re a dork’’
John might report this to me as (51a), which I in turn could report with (51b):
(51) a. John to me: ‘‘Mary thinks you’re not cool’’
b. John believes that Mary believes I’m not cool
We find that in the extended scenario, (45)+(50), both (44) and (51b) are true, the
latter analyzed on a par with the former as John believes de re of Mary that she
believes de re of me that I am not cool.
The next step in the argumentation against the syntactic analysis in (48) would be
to derive a double vision contradiction from the occurrence of a single rigid des-
ignator, i, in the two contradictory belief contents ascribed to John. The fact that
these belief contents are themselves beliefs, containing existential quantification
over acquaintance relations, complicates matters somewhat. It is after all quite
possible that Mary knows me under two distinct guises and thus has two distinct
beliefs that John knows are de re about me. To rule out this possibility we simply
add to our story that John thinks Mary met me only once. Because John doesn’t
recognize me on the second encounter, the unique acquaintance he believes to exist
between me and Mary (call it R) is the one underlying the first scene (which,
moreover, is in fact an acquaintance relation between Mary and Peter). With this
addition we can indeed derive that John believes that Mary believes a contradiction,
viz. that whoever Mary stands in relation R to, me, known under only one guise, is
both cool and not cool.
5.2 Fixing the relational account: longer res movement
Having pinpointed the problem thus, a solution within the relational framework
presents itself. What we must do is move the doubly embedded res one step
further, leaving behind a descriptive guise in the logical representation of John’s
belief as well as in Mary’s. This means that John’s belief is de re about
two individuals, Mary and me. To represent this syntactically we need to gen-




de re ! ky1ky2kPkx9R19R2½R1ðx; y1Þ ^ R2ðx; y2Þ^
Belxku½PðaR1u ; aR2u Þ
With this generalized de re attitude operator we can represent a proper LF:




An attempt at an explicit semi-natural language paraphrase: John believes of Mary
and of me that the former believes of the latter that he is cool. The indexical first
person pronoun is moved outside both belief embeddings, so this relational inter-
pretation should be immune to the double vision problem.
To see that (53) indeed does not suffer from double vision, note that in (53) John
no longer has to believe his representation of Mary (aR1u ) to be acquainted with the
actual me (i), as was the case with (48), but rather with his representation of the
actual me under R2 ðaR2u ). John’s mistaking me and Peter in the first scene, (45),
exploits precisely this distinction between whom one is acquainted with and whom
one believes to be acquainted with.
To verify that (53) really does represent a plausible, contradiction-free reading of
(44), I will describe the acquaintance relations that play a role in the de re beliefs
involved. For ease of reference, then, let’s first write out the logical translation of
(53), which shows the three existentially quantified acquaintance relations.
(54) 9R19R2½R1ðj; mÞ ^ R2ðj; iÞ^Beljku9R3½R3ðaR1u ; aR2u Þ^BelaR1u ku0½coolða
R3
u0 Þ
For R1 we can take John’s actual relation to Mary in the first scene, i.e. their being
friends. For R2 we must take John’s acquaintance with me, but the scenario doesn’t
explicitly specify any such acquaintance. It does say that John ‘‘thinks Mary is
pointing to me’’, which presupposes that John does in fact know me. This implicit
way by which John is acquainted with me is our R2. Now, R3 is supposed to hold in
John’s beliefs between his representation of Mary under R1 (my friend) and his
representation of me under R2 (that guy Emar, say). We can take R3 to be the salient
seeing and pointing relation as witnessed by John in the first scene. The content of
the belief he ascribes to Mary is then that she believes the person she’s pointing to is
cool, which is in line with the story.
As for the negative counterpart report, (51b), note that we can take the same
representation of Mary, R1, but the acquaintance between me and John is different.
The relevant relation here is the perceptual one that goes with the new pointing on
the second encounter, (50). John is acquainted with me as that guy over there that
Mary is pointing at. The third acquaintance relation, between ‘‘my friend Mary’’
and ‘‘the person I see Mary pointing at’’, is, again, that very pointing/seeing rela-
tion. The content of the belief John ascribed to Mary is then that the person she is
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pointing at is not cool. This, too, fits the story precisely. And since the two beliefs
John ascribes to Mary on the basis of our two encounters are really about different
representations (of a single me) there is no contradiction.
I conclude from this and the previous section that the interpretation of iterated de
re belief ascriptions of depth n, strictly require chains of n res movements, as
demonstrated above for n ¼ 2. At the end of this section I briefly discuss the
consequences of this finding.
5.3 Resolving embedded acquaintance presuppositions
In this section I show that my presuppositional account automatically derives a
representation equivalent to the stipulative long res movement LF required by the
classic relational account.
Applying the PrelDRS construction algorithm to our iterated report leaves
everything in situ:
(55) John believes that Mary believes I’m cool
The relevant input context is extracted from the scenario in (45). On the basis of
the discussion in Sect. 5.2 above I already add the information (implicitly conveyed
by (45)) that John knows me:19
ð56Þ
We merge (56) and (55) and start the resolution process. The outermost NP (John)
and the two embedded ones (Mary and I) have each triggered a presupposition. Each of
them will find an antecedent in the main DRS. For the latter two however that means
crossing one, or even two belief boxes. Following our resolution algorithm each
crossing introduces an acquaintance presupposition, representing the de re character
of those ‘wide scope’ resolutions. Binding the res to their obvious antecedents in the
context thus leaves us with three acquaintance presuppositions:
19 It is not absolutely necessary to assume this information to be present in the context at this point. It




The outermost acquaintance presuppositions should be bound, by HOU, in the
global context. R1 is easily bound to the two being friends, as stated explicitly in the
scenario and consequently represented in the context DRS. R2 is supposed to be a
relation between John and me. It can be bound too because we’ve assumed a context
where John already knows me, as someone named Emar (simplistically represented
as the conjunction of the two relevant conditions from the context: emarðzÞ and
knowðx; zÞ).
Finally, we turn to the embedded acquaintance presupposition R3, which relates
John’s R1 representation of Mary with his R2 representation of me. There is nothing
to bind to locally, and the presupposition cannot be moved outside the belief box
without creating unbound variables (v and w).20 So, according to our resolution
algorithm, we must accommodate it locally. Modeling acquaintance accommoda-
tion just like first order presupposition accommodation, we end up with the fol-
lowing output DRS:
ð58Þ
This DRS correctly captures the semantics of the iterated report, as it ascribes the
following thought to John: ‘‘There is an acquaintance between my best friend and
that guy I know called Emar, and the former believes the person she is so acquainted
with is cool’’.
To conclude this section, let’s compare the two solutions to the ‘puzzle of the
doubly embedded indexical’.
20 In PA terminology, the presupposition is ‘trapped’. I’ll assume that this purely syntactic check for
unbinding variables is part of the computation of the accessibility path in (28).
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The first adds to the classic relational account a stipulation enforcing maximal res
movement in the syntax. Res movement is at the heart of the classic account as
presented in Sects. 2–3. It is needed because the relational semantics requires the
complement to be split into a separate res and ascribed predicate.21 On the other
hand, res movement is also the account’s most heavily criticized feature:
Linguists could object that ‘res movement’, i.e., the movement of [the res]
from the specifier position to the left boundary of the sentence violates well-
established locality restrictions and is not attested elsewhere in syntax.
(von Stechow and Zimmermann 2005, p. 3)
It is this same mechanism that Schlenker (2004) calls ‘‘magic’’ (p. 21) calls. Von
Stechow and Zimmermann add that it makes the relational account ‘‘much more
complicated [than Kaplan’s]’’ (p. 3), as does Anand (2006, p. 26), who deems it
‘‘salutary to remove the complex machinery of res movement from the grammar’’.
Von Stechow and Zimmermann, finally, even blame res movement for making the
account ‘‘non-compositional’’ (p. 15), on the understanding that a strictly surface
compositional semantics would have to interpret the res in situ, as fully integrated in
the embedded clause.22 In light of this discussion the result arrived at in Sect. 5.2,
that iterated belief requires even longer res movements, may be construed as extra
evidence against the classic relational account.
On the presuppositional acquaintance framework, the iterated belief with
embedded indexical does not cause any problems. The definite NPs (John, Mary, I)
each trigger their presuppositions in situ. These presuppositions are naturally bound
in the actual context, introducing the relevant acquaintance presuppositions in the
process. Resolving these presuppositions then gets us the desired reading. It is thus
the independently motivated, standard presupposition resolution algorithm which
ensures that the indexical is interpreted de re in the main context, so the problem
signalled in Sect. 5.1 never arises arise.
Note further that the presuppositional derivation shows that the full power of PA
resolution is needed for an acquaintance-based de re semantics. Thus the predicate
presupposition as something that can be bound or accommodated in the global
context or in some non-global sentence internal position, seems warranted. I discuss
a further case of acquaintance accommodation in Sect. 6 below.
21 This separation by syntactic res movement is precisely what sets apart the classic relational analysis
from the rival analysis based on Kaplan’s ‘Adding ‘‘Says’’’ (1989, chap. XX). In a sense, the belief
semantics based on Kaplan’s analysis of indirect speech is truly compositional, without requiring
movements, and covers de dicto, de re and de se uniformly. However, as von Stechow and Zimmermann
show, this approach fails to predict adequate truth conditions for almost every belief ascription. For
detailed proof of the inadequacy of a Kaplanian belief semantics, I refer to the proofs in their paper.
22 Resorting to syntactic movement was done precisely to allow a strictly compositional formulation of
the semantics proper. As Von Stechow and Zimmermann’s quote above points out, the problem then rears
its head in the syntax: how to motivate the movement syntactically?
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6 Quantified belief reports
In this section I show how our system deals with quantified belief reports such
as (59).
(59) Each guy believes he sounds gay
After reviewing the data (6.1), I show that the classic accounts of Sects. 2–3 fail
with respect to these data (6.2), and then show that we really need the flexibility
provided by treating acquaintance as a presupposition in DRT+PA (6.3).
6.1 Judging quantified reports in a mixed context
Consider again the experiment in which Frank and Chris hear recorded voice
samples and judge them gay. Unlike Frank, Chris does not realize he has just judged
his own voice. Our first reaction may be to say that (59) is false as Chris would
never wittingly describe his own voice as gay; only Frank thinks he sounds gay.
Indeed we find this intuition in the literature. Consider Chierchia’s discussion of
a universally quantified report parallel to our (59):
[(60)] Everyone in that room thinks that he is Hume
The most plausible interpretation of [(60)] claims that each person in the
relevant room has a certain de se attitude (perhaps due to schizophrenia).
(Chierchia 1989, p. 10)
On the basis of that general judgment, (59) must be false because only Frank has the
relevant de se attitude. Note that this evidence is somewhat circumstantial, in the
sense that Chierchia does not explicitly consider what would happen in a ‘mixed’ de
re/de se context like ours.
But we could also argue as follows. Since we have judged both (18) (about
Frank) and (19) (about Chris) true individually, in our mixed scenario, we are
bound to judge their conjunction true, and from there we proceed immediately to
judging (59) true as well. Zimmermann (p.c.), explicitly considering a universally
quantified report like (59) in a mixed scenario, reports the same judgment: uni-
versally quantified reports do not require everybody in the domain to have the
same de se attitude.
The picture that emerges from the scarce data discussed above is the following:
whenever a quantified subject binds a belief report’s res, there is a preference for
‘universal de se’ readings, but under contextual pressure, such as with (59) in a
mixed context where the universal de se reading would be false, we can allow
different de re and de se acquaintance relations. This reconciles Chierchia’s remark
with Zimmermann’s. Moreover, this default preference for universal de se is en-
tirely parallel to the observed preference for de se in simple reports, and should
come out as a derivative thereof in the final semantic analysis.
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6.2 Previous attempts: de re/de se unification versus separation
First, let’s apply the standard relational de re/de se semantics of Sects. 3.1–3.2.
Assume a de re parse with res-moved he, bound by a quantifier-raised each guy
Translating each guy as a generalized quantifier, as in (61), we’d get the truth
conditions in (62):
(61) each guy ! kX8x½guyðxÞ ! XðxÞ
(62) ð59Þ!8x½guyðxÞ!9R½Rðx; xÞ ^ Belxku½sounds gayðtheðkvðRðu; vÞÞÞÞ
In this representation, each of the guys has a de re belief about himself, i.e. each is
in some way acquainted with himself and believes under that acquaintance relation
that he sounds gay. In this weak reading it is not required that they both have the
same acquaintance relation, just that for each individual we can find a suitable one.
In the mixed scenario we can: equality for Frank, ‘the person whose voice I’m
hearing’ for Chris. Thus, the sentence is predicted to be true. Conclusion: the plain
relation semantics derives Zimmermann’s judgment, but not the default all-de se
behavior predicted by Chierchia.
Then consider Chierchia’s de se separatist account, discussed in Sect. 3.3. Chi-
erchia introduces a syntactic ambiguity between de re and de se LFs. On a de se
parsing we get universal de se truth conditions:
(63) Each guy believes he sounds gay
In the mixed scenario the strong reading represented by this LF is false, because
Chris doesn’t have the required de se belief. This prediction corresponds to the
judgments suggested by Chierchia. The question is whether the other reading
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somehow captures the Zimmermann judgment. This, it turns out, depends on how
the separatist understands ‘de re’. If it means mere de re, excluding de se, then the
‘de re LF’ is also false, because only Chris holds such a strictly de re belief. If,
however, the de re reading would include de se as a special case, as when we take
the LF and semantics of the plain relational account for the second reading, we’d get
a true reading.
Chierchia’s own account is unclear about the semantics of the de re LF but
Percus & Sauerland (2003a) seem to hold this ‘overlapping meanings’ view of the
ambiguity. The prediction is that (59) has both a true and a false reading in our
mixed scenario, allowing us to make some sense of the conflicting intuitions of
Chierchia and Zimmermann. Moreover, if they would stipulate a general preference
for de se LFs they would even get the observed default behavior right (for both
embedded and simple reports).
My objections against this kind of approach are not so much empirical as
methodological. Very generally, one should avoid resorting to syntactic ambiguity
in the absence of an independent, syntactic motivation. We’ll see below how the
evidence in favor of the ambiguity can be accounted for in a non-ambiguous way by
using dynamic acquaintance resolution. For now, let me point out another theo-
retical desideratum. We would like to derive the preference for de se from some-
thing more basic. Also, postulating a preference for a certain LF in a static
framework cannot quite capture the idea of contextual pressure overriding a given
default. It is in its analysis of this context-dependence that the dynamicity of my
presuppositional account paid off in the case of unembedded reports, so let’s see
how that extends to the quantified version.
6.3 Presupposing acquaintance
Recall that a major advantage of the presuppositional framework over its relational
inspiration was the built-in preference ranking of unifying acquaintance relations,
leading to the desired context-driven asymmetry between de se resolution and
contextually supplied mere de re ones. It may be hoped that this will give us
precisely what’s needed in the quantified case, a preference for universal de se that
may give under contextual pressure.
Let’s see what happens when we interpret the quantified report (59) against the
background of a DRS representing the mixed scenario. The PrelDRS is generated
straightforwardly: he triggers a presupposition, the belief report is parsed compo-





When we add the PrelDRS to the context we get:
ð65Þ
The pronoun will have to cross a belief box to find a suitable antecedent, thus
introducing a second-order acquaintance presupposition before binding in the re-
strictor of the quantifier, to the quantified variable z:
ð66Þ
The result so far reads: each guy has a de re belief about himself that he sounds gay,
under an unspecified acquaintance relation.
Now we must resolve the acquaintance relation R. According to the built-in pref-
erence for de se we should always try equality first. Substituting equality for R and
simplifying the representation a little gives (67), Chierchia’s universal de se reading:
ð67Þ
However, as noted above, this universal de se reading may be preferred in
general, but it happens to be false in our mixed scenario. So, in this particular case we
go back and try to find a different relation for R to bind to. Binding R means finding a
suitable condition relating z to z to equate the presupposed content Rðz; zÞ to. But
because z is introduced locally, by the quantifier, there is no such condition to be
found anywhere in the DRS. As with the embedding in Sect. 5.3, the presupposition
is trapped inside the quantifier, where it cannot find a proper antecedent. So, again as
in the derivation in Sect. 5.3, when binding fails we turn to accommodation.
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Following the algorithm specified in (36) we first try accommodation in the highest
accessible DRS, where binding failed, i.e. the restrictor. Accommodation at subDRS
u means merging the presupposition with u. Restrictor accommodation gives (68):
ð68Þ
On our current analysis of universal quantification, a condition of the form u ) w
means that all discourse referents in the restrictor u are universally quantified over.
With such a semantics, (68) would mean that for all guys z and all their self-acquain-
tance relations R, z would believe the person he’s R-acquainted with to sound gay. Since
everybody is at least acquainted with himself under equality, (68) would be even
stronger than the universal de se reading (67), which was already false in our scenario.
We could simply accept this and, following the resolution algorithm, move on to
try the next accommodation site, which amounts to local accommodation (see (70)
below). But we can do even better, by adopting a selective binding mechanism
(Kamp and Reyle 1993). This means that we replace ) with a so-called duplex
condition that specifies which variables are quantified over. The unquantified dis-
course referents in a quantifier domain are then simply existentially quantified over,
as usual in DRT. To deal with the odd case where a scope DRS contains an
unquantified variable introduced existentially in the restrictor (which is precisely
what happens with R in (68)), we copy the restrictor into the scope, semantically:
ð69Þ
Under this refined DRT view of quantification, the restrictor accommodation DRS
(68) means that all guys that have some acquaintance to themselves, are guys that
have an acquaintance to themselves under which they believe they sound gay. And
since everybody always bears some acquaintance to himself, this information is
semantically redundant in the restrictor, and (68) turns out to be equivalent to the




This represents the desired reading, truth-conditionally equivalent to the one gen-
erated by the relational account (62): for each of the guys we can find some
acquaintance relation under which they believe they sound gay.
To sum up, the static relational account derives only Zimmermann’s true reading,
while (an amended version of) the separatist account derives both Chierchia’s and
Zimmermann’s a matter of syntactic ambiguity. With acquaintance presuppositions
we also get both Chierchia’s reading, by binding to equality, and Zimmermann’s, by
local accommodation, but now without the need for a syntactic ambiguity. What’s
more, relying solely on the independently motivated mechanisms of PA, the former
comes out as the preferred, default option while the latter only surfaces in excep-
tional contexts like our mixed scenario because that default fails to give a consistent
output there. As in the test case discussed in Sect. 5, we’ve used both binding and
accommodation in the resolution of the acquaintance variable. I take this a sufficient
justification for the strong claim that acquaintance is not simply context-dependent,
but really is best thought of as a presupposition, as modeled within a representa-
tional dynamic theory like DRT+PA.
7 Shifted indexicals and de se pronouns
In Sects. 3, 4 and 6 we have discussed sentences of the form x believes that he is P
that report beliefs about oneself. The reason such co-referential reports are inter-
esting is that they have both de se and de re interpretations, even when embedded
under quantifiers. We have noted that the former is the default, with the latter
surfacing only in mistaken identity scenarios. We have been comparing two types of
analyses. The one postulates a syntactic ambiguity between de re and de se LFs, the
other, my own, provides a uniform, underspecified representation, pushing the de re/
de se distinction from syntax down to pragmatics. I successfully countered one of
the arguments from the separatists, based on Chierchia’s universal de se reading of
quantified reports in Sect. 6. In the current section we answer another, more serious
challenge for unified relational approaches.
This challenge involves reports that have only de se readings. The central
observation, which has attracted some attention in the recent semantics literature, is
that natural languages provide different ways of constructing such ‘de se reports’.
Because the relational analysis of de re treats de re and de se as special cases of a
general relational LF, or in our cases as particular contextual resolutions of a single
PrelDRS, it naturally has trouble accounting for constructions that are purely de se.
In a sense this is precisely the downside of the de re/de se unification motivating the
relational analysis. Therefore, all unified de re/de se analyses, including Kaplan’s
quantified characters and my acquaintance presuppositions, are expected to inherit
this difficulty.
So what are the data? De se reports come in three varieties: (i) reports with shifted
first person subjects; (ii) infinitival and gerundial reports with silent PRO subjects, as
discussed in Sect. 3.3; and (iii) reports with logophoric subjects. In Sect. 7.1 I show
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that my unification of not only de re and de se but also de dicto makes for a very
attractive analysis of de se reports of the shifted first person variety. The idea is that
rather than assigning them a dedicated de se LF (cf. e.g. Schlenker 2003), or treating
them as de re reports (cf. Maier 2006, 2009) shifted reports come out as de dicto
reports, if we just follow our previously established unified representations and res-
olution algorithm. In Sect. 7.3 I show why this analysis does not extend to (ii) and (iii),
and then follow Anand (2006) in positing a distinct class of syntactic de se con-
structions for them.
7.1 Shifted indexicality
In Amharic (Leslau 1995; Schlenker 2003; Anand 2006), as in a number of other
languages (cf. Schlenker to appear), an unmistakably indexical first person form
embedded in a belief or speech report may refer not to the actual speaker of the
report, but to the subject of the attitude:23
(71) jon j egna n e-n˜n˜ yil -all [Amharic]
john hero be -1.sg say.3.sg -aux.3.sg
‘Johni says that hei is a hero’ (Schlenker 2003, p. 68)
For convenience I will henceforth rely on a free gloss of this example to illustrate the
phenomenon of shifted indexicality. I refer to Anand and Nevins (2004) and Anand
(2006) for a thorough linguistic investigation that takes into account some of the cross-
linguistic variety with respect to which verbs can or must shift which indexicals.
In Sect. 3.3 we’ve seen Chierchia’s analysis of PRO as bound by an operator in a
dedicated de se LF. Building on this idea, von Stechow (2002) analyzes shifted
indexicals as variables bound by the attitude verb. As a result, Amharic I is not
interpreted as an indexical, but rather as a bound variable.
Schlenker builds a framework in which the Amharic construction is, semantically
speaking, the default way of reporting a de se attitude. The English way of reporting
becomes the challenge: he has to posit a morpho-syntactic feature deletion rule to get
the same de se reading for English co-referential de re/de se reports like (18) (Frank
believes he sounds gay). Schlenker’s account thus also follows Chierchia’s in intro-
ducing two distinct logical forms, one for de re and one for de se. The price for getting
Amharic right, is the assumption, contra Kaplan and relational analyses, of a syntactic
ambiguity and uninterpreted third person features in Frank believes he sounds gay.
On the other hand, on a de se-as-de re account the shifted first person is highly
problematic. In a sense, the reason such analyses have trouble with shifted I
is precisely that they treat de se as a subspecies of de re. The res is logically
23 To argue that we are not just dealing with a kind of generic, non-indexical pronoun, Schlenker shows
that the Amharic first person behaves exactly like English I in non-reportative contexts (including other
subordinate clauses and quantifiers). To argue that we are not dealing simply with direct quotation
Schlenker and others point out mixed reports containing shifted and non-shifted expressions, and Anand




represented outside the belief context, so a first person pronoun syntactically
embedded as res will always refer to the actual speaker. This corresponds to
Kaplan’s (1989) well-known ‘prohibition of monsters’, which works fine for Eng-
lish he and I, but fails for Amharic and other languages that allow shifted indexicals.
In particular, the relational account incorrectly predicts that (71) means the same
as its literal English counterpart: John says that I am a hero. The presuppositional
version inherits this faulty prediction, as shown in the derivation below: the
embedded I is bound to the actual speaker, creating a de re representation with an
acquaintance presupposition between the belief subject and me:
ð72Þ
7.2 De se as de dicto
As soon as we resolve the Amharic I globally, to the actual speaker, as in (72), we
get the English-type de re reading. Based on this diagnosis, Maier (2006, 2009)
proposes that the Amharic I here is bound locally, to John’s belief center, i.e.
himself. However, this previous analysis still regards (71), syntactically, as a de re
report, causing a tension that requires some rather complicated additional machinery
to repair.
In the current framework the distinction between de re and de dicto is moved
from the syntax to the resolution stage: each report gets the same unified PrelDRS
that can resolve to either a de dicto, de re or de se output, depending on the context.
If we now follow previous presuppositional analyses of Amharic shifting (Maier
2006, 2009; Hunter and Asher 2005) as local resolution of the embedded I to the
(implicit) first person attitude center, we completely bypass the introduction of
acquaintance presuppositions. We should get de se without de re for Amharic
constructions. To flesh out this proposal technically, I extend the idea of building an
explicit center representation into belief DRSs from de re resolutions to all PrelDRS
representations of beliefs.24 The Amharic first person pronoun then binds to this,
semantically first person, local center, which immediately gives the right, de se
reading: In all of John’s belief alternatives, the center, he himself, is a hero (cf. (31),
p. 19).
24 Because we model belief sets as sets of centered worlds, every belief has a center, a first person
‘experiencer’, and it is safe to assume that the construction algorithm furnishes every belief DRS with a
representation of its center, as we are already doing for all de re resolutions. Alternatively, we could




It looks like we can derive the proper de se output by a simple de dicto resolution.
This, then, is the real payoff of unifying the construction stages for de dicto, de re
and de se and moving the introduction of acquaintance relations from the syntax to
the pragmatic resolution stage.
Let me point out already some predictions of this proposal before filling in the
remaining gaps. First, if the context is set up so that John believes something about
me rather than about himself, the current proposal will generate the alternative, de
re resolution of I shown in (72). In other words, we predict that Amharic allows both
shifted and unshifted interpretations. According to Schlenker and others, this pre-
diction is borne out. Second, since the center predicate is restricted to beliefs (in a
fuller proposal, this would be extended to all attitudes and reported discourse rep-
resentations), the extra binding possibilities introduced for Amharic-type first per-
son pronouns are properly restricted. In particular, we do not generate unwanted
shifty interpretations in other embeddings that have been discussed as potentially
troublesome in the literature (cf. Schlenker’s (2003, p. 69) relative clause embed-
ding in Amharic: ½Myj brotheri found a girl that Ii like; or Partee’s (1989) quanti-
fication over (third person) speakers: Every speaker i has difficulty stopping when
Ii should).
As it stands, however, the proposal is still missing a crucial ingredient: how to
explain the difference between English and Amharic I? In our presuppositional
framework, the simplest solution is to stipulate a difference in resolution preference
between English and Amharic I. I follow Hunter and Asher (2005) who adorn the
presupposition triggered by English, but not Amharic, I with an operator (*)
enforcing global resolution.25
Note that some stipulation like this is unavoidable in the sense that there simply
is a typological, lexical difference between English and Amharic with respect to the
first person. The question is only how best to capture it. In this light, Kaplan’s
(1989) Prohibition of Monsters in English, Schlenker’s (2003) filtering mechanism,
von Stechow’s (2002) ‘Amharic parameter’, and Hunter and Asher’s (2005)
*-presuppositions are all different answers to this question. The last of these
answers just happens to be most compatible with the current DRT framework.26
25 In our system an implementation would require adding a clause to the resolution mechanism that
checks for the presence of * in a presupposition. If an * is detected the recursive checking of binding/
eccommodation possibilities is bypassed and only global binding is tried.
26 This is not to say that I endorse Hunter and Asher’s (2005) analysis of indexical shifting. I merely
borrow their operator for marking that a presupposition has to be bound globally and attach it, lexically,
as do they, to English I. Cf. Maier (2009) for similar adaptation of Hunter and Asher’s *-operator, and for
a critical evaluation of the rest of their account of indexicality.
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The important selling point of my account is that it does not rely on feature
deletion or ‘de-rigidification’ of the indexical in morphosyntax. Everything is taken
care of by our pragmasemantic resolution module, which treats Amharic I as a real,
semantically first person pronoun. The difference between the Amharic shifted I and
the English (or Amharic) rigid I is merely a matter of preferred resolution sites of
the same presupposition: English I must be bound globally, while Amharic I can
also be bound by a local first person, i.e. an attitude center.
The local resolution option of Amharic I is what we previously would have called
a de dicto output. Interestingly, the Amharic shifty I route to de se is quite different
from the English de se resolution of John believes he’s a hero, which goes from
an underspecified PrelDRS to an intermediate de re representation followed by a
default acquaintance resolution to equality. This crucial deviance from my earlier
(2006, 2009) de re analysis of Amharic I is reminiscent of Anand’s (2006) argu-
mentation against a unitary treatment of de se ascriptions in which he too distin-
guishes the de se of shifted indexicality from that of English co-referential he. In the
next section we briefly turn to what Anand considers a third, distinct variety of de se
reporting.
7.3 De se pronouns: PRO and LOG
Now we turn to the remaining cases of unambiguous de se reporting constructions.
First, infinitival complement reports with silent PRO subjects in English, and then
logophorically marked reports as found in many West-African languages.
Let’s recap our discussion of Chierchia’s (1989) arguments for de se LFs from
Sect. 3.3. In our mistaken self-identity scenario Frank recognizes he’s judging his
own voice, but Chris does not. Co-referential he reports are compatible with both
kind of situation, de se and de re, but infinitival reports with silent PRO subjects can
only be read de se:
(74) a. Chris believes that he sounds gay, though he doesn’t realize it.
b. #Chris believes to have a gay voice [*though he doesn’t realize it]
According to Chierchia the overt pronoun construction is ambiguous between a de
re and a de se LF, while the infinitival construction has only the de se LF. Crucially,
in the de se LF, the embedded subject, PRO or he, is bound syntactically.
I have countered some arguments for this syntactic de re/de se ambiguity in
Sects. 4.4, 6.2–6.3, and 7.1–7.2, but the original motivation, the unambiguously de
se truth conditions of (74b), remains. Below I will first show why we can’t simply
extend our de se as de dicto analysis of Amharic I to PRO (and its cousin, the
logophor), before conceding that, in the case of PRO, we are dealing with a purely
syntactic variety of de se after all.
So let’s extend our local binding analysis of Amharic shifted I. As in Sect. 7.2
above, we will derive a de se output by binding the embedded subject, PRO, to the
local belief center. The only thing we have to add is that where Amharic I can be
bound by a local or global first person, PRO must be bound locally. Assuming the
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content of the presupposition lexically triggered by PRO to be center will ensure
the availability of local belief center resolution.27
Note that we are analyzing PRO semantically as a first person pronoun. Although
this gives the right truth conditions, it can’t be the whole story, because there is
independent evidence that PRO bears third person features. We can bring out these
seemingly invisible features by making it bind a reflexive (Schlenker 2003):
(75) John hopes PRO to buy {*myself/himself} a car
Reflexives must be bound in their local domain, so it is really PRO rather than John
that binds himself. And because reflexives agree with their binders, it follows that
PRO is not first but third person. Before attempting a solution to this ‘feature
mismatch problem’, we turn to the phenomenon of logophoricity, where the same
problem shows up in a slightly different guise.
Schlenker (2003) and Anand (2006) argue that the so-called logophoric pronouns
found in West-African languages behave just like PRO, that is, as de se pronouns. A
logophor here is a kind of overt pronoun that occurs only in report contexts and
designates the reported speaker from her own, first person perspective, i.e. de se.
The crucial data involve mistaken identity, which does not allow reporting with
logophoric pronouns:28
(76) o´ so pe´ oun r’I John [Yoruba]
he say that LOG see John
he said he saw John [only felicitous if he said, ‘‘I saw John’’]
(Anand 2006, p. 56)
As far as we’re concerned in this paper, the logophoric pronoun, henceforth LOG, is
just a visible realization of our English PRO under attitudes.
Interestingly, then, in some of these West-African languages with logophors,
including Yoruba, Abe and Ewe, the logophor is commonly taken to be an actual
third person pronoun. Therefore, an analysis of LOG as sketched for PRO above,
i.e. as essentially a first person bound locally by the belief center, runs into the same
feature mismatch problem.
At this point I will follow Anand (2006) in admitting a third, entirely syntactic
route to de se.29 In addition to the pragmasemantic de se as de re (English he) and de
se as de dicto (Amharic I) derivations, this third variety covers the unambiguously
de se PRO and LOG reports. The defining characteristic of this class is that they are
27 To be sure that pragmatic pressure does not overrule the closest binding match, we could further
stipulate a +-operator, the mirror image of Hunter and Asher’s * on English I, meant to enforce local
binding.
28 Schlenker cites similar data in Bafut, attributed to Kusumoto (1998 handout).
29 Maier (2006) sketches a more pragmasemantic solution: PRO and LOG contribute two distinct ele-
ments to the representation, (i) a standard third person pronoun he, and (ii) a restriction on the resolution
of the corresponding acquaintance presupposition to the effect that it must be resolved to equality. I’m not
sure how to elegantly implement this restriction part in the current framework, if only because the
acquaintance presupposition is not part of the PrelDRS.
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de se syntactically. In the current framework that means they are de se at the level of
the PrelDRS already, rather than only after resolution of an underspecified repre-
sentation. Strong evidence in favor of a syntactic treatment of African logophors in
particular comes from Anand’s (2006, x 1.4.4) fieldwork on Yoruba, which shows
syntactic blocking effects with LOG.
On the current view, PRO and LOG are no longer pronouns that trigger pre-
suppositions. In fact, they are more like reflexives, whose binding is almost uni-
versally assumed to take place somewhere in the syntax, during the PrelDRS
construction stage, before the pragmatic resolution stage. Concretely, the PrelDRS
of (76) would look something like this:
ð77Þ
There are many ways to set up the syntax to derive such de se PrelDRSs, one would
be to import a version of Chierchia’s mechanism of binding PRO at LF. Since I have
nothing to add to existing syntactic accounts, I refer to Anand (2006, §. 1.4.3) for a
precise implementation of Chierchia’s syntactic binding mechanism designed to
take care of LOG binding as well.
I conclude that Chierchia was partly right. De se LFs (	 de se PrelDRSs) exist.
However, these LFs are reserved for PRO and LOG exclusively. English co-ref-
erential he, embedded or not, and Amharic or English I reports are all given the
same compositional but underspecified PrelDRS, which, in a context, is resolved
pragmatically to a de dicto, de re, or de se output.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides a pragmatic, unified analysis of de dicto, de re and de se reports.
The analysis is unified in the sense that it generates uniform, but highly under-
specified, preliminary representations for (almost) all belief reports. It is pragmatic
in the sense that it’s the pragmatic DRT presupposition resolution mechanism that
does all the work. This allows us to keep the syntax and semantics entirely
straightforward: no syntactic ambiguity, no feature deletion, minimal movements
and invisible items, and a simple possible worlds semantics.
My core proposal has two main ingredients. The first is a resurrection of a
traditional analysis of the de re/de dicto ambiguity as a scope ambiguity. In a DRT
setting this means that a presupposition triggered inside a report complement can
resolve locally to derive de dicto, or globally to derive de re. I adapt the presup-
position resolution algorithm to incorporate the idea that a de re representation
always involves a context-dependent acquaintance relation/mode of presentation.
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The context-dependence of acquaintance is modeled as presuppositional as well.
The adapted resolution algorithm specifies that whenever a presupposition moves
out of a belief, it triggers the introduction of such an acquaintance presupposition.
The second ingredient of my proposal is the method of resolving this presup-
posed acquaintance relation. By default, we always first try to bind it to the relation
of equality, which will yield a de se output. If the context does not allow this, we
search for a suitable and salient other relation that holds between subject and res.
Technically, this involves binding a second-order presupposed discourse referent,
modeled in terms of a process known as higher-order unification. The default res-
olution to equality captures the privileged status of de se interpretations with respect
to mere de re ones that we see already in simple ambiguous reports of the form xi
believes that heiis P.
After presenting this presuppositional proposal as well as the syntactically ori-
ented classical approach, I applied them both to a number of interesting test cases.
The first involves reports of beliefs about de re beliefs. The classical syntactic
account of de re runs into problems, which can only be fixed by stipulating a longer
res-movement, which was already considered the weak point of this type of ap-
proach. My presuppositional account derives the right readings immediately. The
only interesting thing to note is that the derivations involve not only higher-order
binding, but also accommodation of acquaintance presuppositions.
The next test involved quantified de re/de se belief reports like everyone believes
that he is P. In the classical framework, a syntactic de re/de se ambiguity is required
to generate all available readings. The presuppositional approach, however, derives
these readings from a single, syntactic structure (or rather, from a single preliminary
DRS). Moreover, it correctly predicts that we always get a universal de se inter-
pretation, unless speaker and hearer know that the domain of quantification contains
some normal de se believers and some mistaken identity de re believers. Only in
that particular case can we accommodate the acquaintance presupposition and arrive
at a true, mixed de re/de se reading.
Finally, I considered unambiguously de se reports. The first example is the
shifted interpretation of the first person in Amharic, where John believes I’m a hero
means that John believes de se that he’s a hero. In our DRT framework we can
transparently represent Amharic I as triggering a first person presupposition. This
presupposition can be bound by the actual speaker, yielding the English-style de re
interpretation; or by the local, first person experiencer or ‘center’ of the belief,
yielding the ‘shifted’ de se reading. I then turned to infinitival report constructions
(xbelieves to have been P) and West-African logophors, known to allow only de se
interpretations. Here, I was forced to make some concessions. Following Anand
(2006) I proposed that these constructions are de se syntactically. We thus end up
with three types of de se, exemplified by (i) English he, which resolves de re and
creates an acquaintance presupposition that prefers to be bound to equality; (ii)
Amharic I which resolves de dicto, by binding locally to the belief center; and (iii)
infinitival and logophoric reports, which have a different syntactic structure from
which a de se PrelDRS gets formed in the DRS construction stage. Note however,
that the first two of these de se types are just instances of the general belief
472 E. Maier
123
representation and resolution that covers all other de dicto and de re reports,
including embedded, iterated and quantified ones.
Thus, I hope to have convinced the reader that de dicto/de re and de re/de se
ambiguities are pragmatic rather than syntactic ambiguities. Furthermore, I have
tried to show how the presupposition-as-anaphora theory in DRT can be used to
properly formalize the pragmatic resolution of underspecified belief representations
to de dicto, de re or de se outputs, according to contextual demands.
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